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Abstract
Spread decomposition and variance decomposition methodologies have been developed and
used in the literature to obtain measures of information asymmetry about Þrms. We exam-
ine the relation between these market microstructure measures and information asymmetry
about the future cash ßows of Þrms. First, to test whether diﬀerences in information asym-
metry are suﬃcient to generate diﬀerences in the estimated measures, we examine a large
cross-section of stocks employing various proxies for uncertainty about future cash ßows or
informativeness of prices. We Þnd that the market microstructure measures do not consis-
tently reßect uncertainty about future cash ßows or relate to the informativeness of prices
in a manner that is compatible with their use as proxies for information asymmetry. Sec-
ond, to test whether changes in information asymmetry about the Þrm are necessary for the
estimated measures to change, we conduct an event study of the Russell 1000 index reconsti-
tution. We Þnd that the information asymmetry measures change around the event despite
the fact that Russell 1000 membership is based on market capitalization and therefore the
event is not associated with any change in private information about the Þrms.
Information Asymmetry about the Firm and the Permanent Price Impact of Trades: Is there a Connection?
One of the heavily used paradigms in Finance is that of information asymmetry among
investors (or between investors and managers) about the future cash ßows of a Þrm. A
problem with testing models that postulate information asymmetry is that the extent of
information asymmetry among investors (or, for that matter, the amount of trading by
informed investors) is usually unobservable. The market microstructure literature proposed a
solution to this problem in the form of a number of econometric techniques for estimating the
extent of information asymmetry (or the intensity of informed trading) using its implications
for the patterns of prices and quotes. These econometric techniques were motivated by
theoretical models that explain the price impacts of trades or the existence of the bid-ask
spread by means of order processing costs, inventory costs, and information asymmetry
among investors as to the future cash ßows (or liquidation value) of the Þrm. While all these
causes give rise to a spread, they diﬀer slightly in their implications as to the adjustment
patterns of prices and quotes. These diﬀerences enabled researchers to use the insights of the
models to search for ways to empirically estimate a measure of price impact due to informed
trading that can be used as a proxy for information asymmetry.
A number of papers set out to develop methodologies, each using a diﬀerent set of assump-
tions, for estimating the adverse selection component of the spread or the permanent
impact of the order ßow innovation or the trade-correlated component of the random-walk
variance of quote midpoint changesall measures of the degree of information asymmetry
among investors (see, for example, Glosten, 1987; Glosten and Harris, 1988; Hasbrouck,
1988; Stoll, 1989; George, Kaul, and Nimalendran, 1991; Hasbrouck, 1991a; Hasbrouck,
1991b; Madhavan and Smidt, 1991; Huang and Stoll, 1997; Madhavan, Richardson, and
Roomans, 1997).1 The theoretical models that motivated these econometric techniques have
never been tested by independently identifying information asymmetry about the Þrm and
1Easley, Kiefer and OHara (1997a, 1997b) estimate a structural model that does not utilize price patterns
to estimate the probability of informed trade from the daily number of buy and sell orders. While the current
paper focuses on price-related methodologies, the conceptual issues raised here apply in general when trade
data is used to characterize information asymmetry among investors.
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then looking to see if it generates the predicted implications. Nonetheless, the idea that
trading on private information about the future cash ßows of a Þrm should have perma-
nent impact on prices seemed intuitive enough to warrant using these techniques without
attempting to test them empirically.
While trading on private information about the Þrm may very well cause permanent
price impacts, it may not be the only reason for them. Saar (2000a, 2000b) provides a
framework where all investors have the same information about the future cash ßows of the
Þrm, but trades can still have permanent price impacts. The driving force behind his model
is uncertainty about the preferences and endowments of the investor population. When
investors are risk averse, the preferences and endowments of investors join the future cash
ßows of the asset to determine equilibrium prices. The price impact of trades is created when
prices adjust to reßect information that the market learns about characteristics of investors
that have nothing to do with the Þrm. Saar (2000a) simulates the model and applies a
spread decomposition procedure to the simulated data. Over 90% of the spread created in
the model is attributed by the procedure to the adverse selection or permanent component
despite the fact that all investors in the model have the same information about the Þrm.
Testing the investor uncertainty explanation for the permanent price impact of trades
may not be straightforward, as quantifying the degree of uncertainty about the preferences
and endowments of investors is perhaps even more diﬃcult than identifying information
asymmetry about the Þrm. However, if the econometric methodologies can pick up both
information asymmetry about the Þrm and uncertainty about investors, interpretation of
the estimates becomes diﬃcult and using them to characterize the information environment
may be ineﬀective.2 The extensive usage of these methodologies to characterize the degree
of information asymmetry about the Þrm necessitates examining the question whether the
permanent price impact of trades estimated using these techniques really comes from private
2While uncertainty about the investor population can conceptually include uncertainty about investors
knowledge of the future cash ßows, we use the term investor uncertainty do denote uncertainty about the
preferences and endowments of investors. Diﬀerences among investors with respect to information about the
Þrm are called information asymmetry.
2
information about the prospects of Þrms. Our objective is to investigate this question.
We divide the investigation into suﬃcient and necessary parts. The suﬃcient part
examines whether diﬀerences in information asymmetry about the Þrms future cash ßows
are suﬃcient to produce diﬀerences in the information asymmetry measures estimated us-
ing these methodologies. We conduct this investigation by cross-sectionally relating these
measures to estimates of uncertainty about the Þrms future cash ßows and price informa-
tiveness, employing various controls and econometric speciÞcations. The necessary part
examines whether changes in information asymmetry about the Þrms future cash ßows are
necessary for the information asymmetry measures to change (holding constant the amount
of uninformed trading). We analyze this issue using an event study where we look at changes
in the information asymmetry measures around an event where we know there is no change
in information about the Þrm: the Russell 1000 index reconstitution. Membership in the
Russell 1000 is determined solely based on market capitalization at a single point in time
(May 31), and therefore does not add information to what the market already knows.
We use two representative methods to estimate the information asymmetry measures.
The Þrst method, from Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997), provides an estimate
of the permanent impact of the order ßow innovation (MRR). The second method, from
Hasbrouck (1991b), is a decomposition of the eﬃcient price variance that provides us with
two measures: (i) the trade-correlated eﬃcient price variance component that serves as an
absolute measure of information asymmetry (HASAB), and (ii) the ratio of the trade-
correlated component to the total eﬃcient price variance that serves as a relative measure
of the amount of private information to the total amount of information (HASR).
For the cross-sectional part of the study, we need to quantify information asymmetry
about future cash ßows outside of these econometric techniques. We start by using uncer-
tainty about future cash ßows to represent information asymmetry since the greater the
uncertainty, the more room (and incentives) there is for investors to acquire private infor-
mation and trade on it proÞtably. Two of our proxies for uncertainty about future cash
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ßows are based on dispersion in analysts earnings forecasts, and the other two are based on
past earnings variability. We Þnd that only HASAB (the trade-correlated component of the
eﬃcient price variance) is related to both analysts forecasts and past earnings proxies for
uncertainty about future cash ßows in the predicted direction. HASR is not related to any
of the proxies for future cash ßows uncertainty, and MRR provides conßicting results that
are even more puzzling since it is negatively related to dispersion in analysts forecasts.
We continue the suﬃcient part of the investigation with a set of regressions of current
returns on future changes in earnings that we use to quantify how much of the information
about future earnings is impounded into current prices. Ceteris paribus, the more trading
on private information about the Þrm, the more informative should prices be with respect
to future earnings (see, for example, Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). We Þnd that none of the
information asymmetry measures relates to price informativeness in the predicted manner.
In the event study, we examine how the information asymmetry measures change from
the last trading week in May (before the new ranking of the Russell 1000 is established)
to the Þrst trading week in July (when the new index takes eﬀect). We Þnd that MRR
and HASAB decrease signiÞcantly, and show that the decrease cannot be attributed just
to changes in normal trading around the event. We test the robustness of our Þndings
with respect to alternative estimation intervals, price level eﬀects, and possible changes in
market-wide liquidity, and Þnd that these do not change our conclusions.
The results we present have implications for the vast number of papers that use econo-
metric procedures based on the price impact of trades to characterize the degree of infor-
mation asymmetry about the Þrm. In addition to the aforementioned papers that establish
the methodologies, other market microstructure papers use these measures to compare be-
tween markets (Neal, 1992; Aﬄeck-Graves, Hedge, and Miller, 1994; Porter and Weaver,
1996), examine the importance of trade size (Lin, Sanger, and Booth, 1995; Heßin and
Shaw, 2000b), characterize investors intraday and daily trading patterns (Wei, 1992; Foster
and Viswanathan, 1993), and look at the liquidity eﬀects of introducing a futures contact
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(Jegadeesh and Subrahmanyam, 1993).
These measures are also used outside of market microstructure to investigate information
asymmetry in the contexts of corporate events (Brooks, 1994; Jennings, 1994; Barclay and
Dunbar, 1996; Krinsky and Lee, 1996; Desai, Nimalendran, and Venkataraman, 1998), the
debt-equity mix (Illesy and Shastri, 2000), corporate diversiÞcation (Fee and Thomas, 1999),
disclosure quality (Heßin, Shaw, and Wild, 2000), the opaqueness of banking Þrms assets
(Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran, 2000), the size of the analyst following (Brennan and
Subrahmanyam, 1995), and ownership structure (Heßin and Shaw, 2000a; Sarin, Shastri,
and Shastri, 2000, Dennis and Weston, 2001; Dey and Radhakrishna, 2001).
Three papers in particular are related to our investigation: Neal and Wheatley (1998) and
Clarke and Shastri (2000, 2001). Neal and Wheatley use econometric spread decomposition
procedures to examine 17 closed-end funds. They postulate that since the net asset value of
each fund is reported every week, there can be little information asymmetry about the current
liquidation value, and therefore very little by means of an adverse selection component. Still,
they Þnd large adverse selection estimates for the closed-end funds in their sample. They
conclude that either the estimates of the adverse selection components are unreliable, or
that they reßect something other than information asymmetry about the current liquidation
value. Clarke and Shastri (2001) examine a larger cross-section of closed-end funds and
reach diﬀerent conclusions. In particular, they argue that uncertainty about private beneÞts
paid to blockholders lead to higher adverse selection costs, and document a positive relation
between blockholdings and the adverse selection component. While the question Neal and
Wheatley raise is in the spirit of our own motivation, the contrasting results using closed-end
funds seem to suggest that a more fruitful approach could be a direct analysis of equities.
Our focus on a large cross-section of equities and the investigation of the event study allow
us to reach stronger conclusions on the relation between future cash ßow information and
both spread decomposition and variance decomposition measures.
Clarke and Shastri (2000) use six econometric methodologies to estimate information
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asymmetry measures for 320 Þrms. They look at how these measures relate to each other,
and also at the correlations between the measures and certain Þrm characteristics. The cor-
relations with Þrm characteristics are statistically signiÞcant only for net sales and a dummy
for regulated Þrms. A correlation with analysts forecast errors is statistically signiÞcant only
for large Þrms. While our paper also uses analysts for some of the tests (though not forecast
errors but rather dispersion in earnings forecasts), the focus of their paper is diﬀerent from
ours. They take the estimated measures to represent information asymmetry, and examine
whether all of them represent the same information, and whether they are correlated with
variables such as the ratio of R&D expenses to operating expenses or sales growth. We, on
the other hand, design the investigation to test whether the econometric measures indeed
provide useful depictions of information asymmetry about future cash ßows of the Þrms.
Our paper is also related to the literature that investigates what causes or explains price
movements (or equivalently, total return variation). This literature usually focuses on a very
diﬀerent horizon from ours (e.g., monthly returns) and examines whether return variation is
caused by shocks to expected future cash ßows of the assets or by shocks to future expected
returns (the discount rate eﬀect). This distinction is similar in nature to the diﬀerence
between attributing the permanent price impact of trades to news about future cash ßows
(e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle , 1985) or to uncertainty about the preferences and
endowments of investors that aﬀects the risk premium (Saar, 2000a, 2000b).3 Fama (1990),
for example, Þnds that the discount rate eﬀect accounts for about 30% of the variance of
annual real returns on a value-weighted portfolio of NYSE stocks. Campbell and Ammer
3In the classical CAPM, investors preferences and endowments determine a risk premium that is a
property of the market. In such a simple framework, order ßow in any stock should provide information
about the pricing of all stocks. However, Levy (1978), Merton (1987) and Shapiro (2001) develop models
where investors do not invest in all assets in the economy. These papers formalize the investor recognition
hypothesis whereby investors only trade stocks on which they know something. The expected return
of each stock in these models depends on the characteristics of its speciÞc clientele of investors. Such a
framework allows information about investors to aﬀect the value of a single stock or a subset of stocks
without aﬀecting all stocks in the market. The investor recognition hypothesis introduces yet another
reason for uncertainty about the characteristics of the investor populationawareness of a stock. When
awareness changes (without any private information about future cash ßows), the aggregation of preferences
and endowments of those investing in the stock changes as well. Therefore, learning about awareness of
investors can generate permanent price impacts.
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(1993) use a VAR decomposition of monthly stock excess returns and Þnd that only 15% of
the variance of returns is attributed to the variance of news about future dividends, while
70% is attributed to the variance of news about future excess returns.
Our diﬀerent focus is reßected in both the short horizon we examinetrade by tradeand
in the fact that we do not try to quantify the contribution of either explanation (information
asymmetry about future cash ßows or investor uncertainty) to the permanent price impact
for trades. We believe that, as the aforementioned papers found for the long horizon, both
information asymmetry about future cash ßows and uncertainty about investor characteris-
tics that are unrelated to the Þrm contribute to price changes. The question we attempt to
answer in this paper is whether estimates of the permanent price impact of the order ßow
produced by spread decomposition and random-walk variance decomposition procedures are
useful for identifying changes or diﬀerences in the information asymmetry about future cash
ßows.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the information asymmetry
measures we use and the design of the tests. Section 2 presents the cross-sectional analysis
that relates the information asymmetry measures to proxies for uncertainty about future cash
ßows. Section 3 investigates the relation between the information asymmetry measures and
price informativeness. Section 4 examines changes in the information asymmetry measures
around the Russell 1000 index reconstitution. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the
results.
1 Information Asymmetry Measures
There are several methods for estimating the permanent impact of the order ßow innova-
tion or the adverse selection component of the spread using trade-indicator models.4 As
a representative of these techniques we take Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997).
Let xt denote an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the transaction at time t is buyer
4See Huang and Stoll (1997) for a discussion of the relationships among these methods.
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initiated and −1 if it is seller initiated, and let µt denote the post-trade expected value of
a stock.5 The revision of beliefs following a trade is the sum of the change in beliefs due to
public information and change in beliefs due to the order ßow innovation:
µt = µt−1 + θ (xt −E[xt|xt−1]) + ²t (1)
where θ is the permanent impact of the order ßow innovation and is a measure of the degree
of information asymmetry, and ²t is the innovation in beliefs between times t−1 and t due to
public information. Let pt denote the transaction price at time t, and φ denote the market
makers cost per share of supplying liquidity (compensating them for order processing costs,
inventory costs, and so on). The transaction price can then be expressed as:
pt = µt + φxt + ξt (2)
where ξt captures the eﬀects of stochastic rounding errors induced by price discreteness or
possibly time-varying returns.
Equations (1) and (2) can be used to obtain:
ut = pt − pt−1 − (φ+ θ)xt + (φ+ ρθ)xt−1 (3)
where ρ is the Þrst-order autocorrelation of the trade initiation variable. Then, the measure of
information asymmetry θ, alongside φ, ρ, λ (the unconditional probability that a transaction
occurs within the quoted spread), and a constant α can be estimated using GMM applied
to the following moment conditions:
E

xtxt−1 − x2t−1ρ
|xt|− (1− λ)
ut − α
(ut − α)xt
(ut − α)xt−1
 = 0 (4)
We use data from the TAQ database to estimate (4).6 Following Madhavan et al., the
5Madhavan et al. note that some trades (such as those with prices between the bid and the ask) can be
viewed as both buyer and seller initiated, and set for those xt = 0.
6We apply various Þlters to clean the data. We eliminate trades with irregular settlement or with prices
that seem unreasonable relative to the previous trade or the prevailing quote. We also eliminate quotes with
halt or fast trading conditions, and quotes where the bid is greater than the ask or that have unreasonable
spreads.
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classiÞcation into buys and sells is done as follows: (i) if a trade price is greater than or
equal to the prevailing ask then xt = 1, (ii) if the trade price is less than or equal to the bid
then xt = −1, and (iii) if the trade price falls between the bid and the ask then xt = 0. We
use the log transaction price for pt, and refer to the estimate of θ as the MRR measure.
7
The second methodology that we employ to estimate measures of information asymmetry
based on the price changes induced by trades is the variance decomposition of Hasbrouck
(1991b). In his speciÞcation, the quote midpoint qt is the sum of two unobservable compo-
nents:
qt = mt + st (5)
where mt is the eﬃcient price (i.e., expected end-of-trading security value conditional on all
time-t public information) and st is a residual discrepancy term that is assumed to incorpo-
rate inventory control, price discreteness, and other inßuences that cause the midquote to
deviate from the eﬃcient price. The eﬃcient price evolves as a random walk:
mt = mt−1 + wt (6)
where the innovation wt reßects updates to the public information set including the infor-
mation in the order ßow.
The markets signal of private information is the current trade innovation deÞned as
xt − E[xt|Φt−1], where Φt−1 is the public information set prior to the trade. The impact of
the trade innovation on the eﬃcient price innovation is E [wt |xt −E[xt|Φt−1] ]. Two measures
of information asymmetry that Hasbrouck proposes are:
σ2w,x ≡ Var (E [wt |xt −E[xt|Φt−1] ]) (7)
R2w ≡
σ2w,x
σ2w
=
Var (E [wt |xt − E[xt|Φt−1] ])
Var(wt)
(8)
7Madhavan et al. estimate (4) using the transaction price, rather than its logarithmic transformation,
and therefore the components they estimate are in dollar terms (i.e., components of the dollar spread). In
the cross-sectional part of the paper (both in Section 2 and Section 3), We use log transaction prices to
get components in percentage terms (i.e., components of the relative spread), since those seem to be better
suited for comparisons across stocks. In the event study (Section 4), we estimate two versions of θ: one using
dollar prices and the other using log prices. The results from both speciÞcations are similar.
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where σ2w,x is the trade-correlated component of the random-walk variance of quote midpoint
changes and is an absolute measure of information asymmetry, while R2w is a measure of the
amount of private information relative to the total amount of information.
Let x0t be an indicator variable that takes the values {−1, 0,+1}, and deÞne: x1t = xt
(the signed volume), x2t = sign(xt)(xt)
2 (a signed, quadratic volume variable), and x0t =
{x0t , x1t , x2t}. Let rt = log qt − log qt−1. Following Hasbrouck, the absolute and relative
information asymmetry measures are estimated using the vector autoregressive (VAR) model:
rt =
5X
i=1
airt−i +
5X
i=0
b0ixt−i + v1,t (9)
xt =
5X
i=1
cirt−i +
5X
i=1
Dixt−i + v2,t (10)
where bi is a 3 × 1 vector of coeﬃcients, Di is a 3 × 3 matrix of coeﬃcients, and v2,t is a
3× 1 vector of error terms.
We use data from the TAQ database to estimate the VAR model in (9) and (10). Fol-
lowing Hasbrouck, the trade classiÞcation into buys and sells is done as follows: (i) if a
trade price is greater than the prevailing midquote then x0t = 1, (ii) if the trade price is less
than the prevailing midquote then x0t = −1, and (iii) if the trade price is at the prevailing
midquote then x0t = 0.
8 We estimate the VAR system using OLS. A Þnite VAR generally
possesses a vector moving average (VMA) representation of an inÞnite order. The random
walk variance and the trade-correlated component are calculated from the coeﬃcients of the
VMA representation truncated after 100 lags.9 Throughout the paper, we will refer to the
estimate of the absolute measure, expressed in the form of standard deviation per hour, as
the HASAB measure, and to the estimate of the relative measure as the HASR measure.
8Hasbrouck considers two types of event: (i) a trade, or (ii) a quote change without a trade in the previous
5 seconds. Each event has an associated rt and xt. The return associated with a trade event is the diﬀerence
between the prevailing log midquote at the time of the trade and the log midquote subsequent to the trade.
If there is a change of quote in the 5 seconds after a trade, it is considered to be brought about by the trade
and the return associated with that trade is the change in log midquotes. If there is no quote change in
the Þve seconds after the trade, the prevailing midquote continues to be in eﬀect, and the return associated
with the trade is zero. Whenever a quote changes without a trade in the previous 5 seconds, there is a quote
change event, and it is considered a change in prices due to public information. In this case, the return is
the change in log midquotes and xt=0.
9See Hasbrouck (1991b) for a detailed exposition of the methodology.
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2 Cross-Sectional Analysis
2.1 Sample
The initial sample for the cross-sectional investigation is constructed by including all common
stocks with information in the CRSP database for the entire year of 1999 that had more than
one analyst covering them in the I/B/E/S database. The reason for requiring more than one
analyst is to allow the calculation of the standard deviation of analysts earnings forecasts.
This screen leaves 3,144 stocks. The sample is further restricted to Þrms with information in
TAQ, COMPUSTAT, and Value Line Investment Survey in order to allow the computation
of the information asymmetry measures and the construction of other variables that will be
explained in greater detail below. This requirement eliminates 268 Þrms from the sample,
leaving a Þnal sample of 2876 Þrms.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the sample. The average daily market capital-
ization (AvgCap) over the sample period (January 4 through December 31, 1999) for Þrms
in our sample ranges from $6.05M to $446.16B, testifying to its heterogeneous nature. The
sample also spans a range of trading activity and price levels. The most active Þrm has on
average 29,809.45 daily trades (AvgTrd), while the average Þrm has 442.67 daily trades, and
the least actively traded Þrm in the sample has 3.03 trades per day. Average daily closing
prices (AvgPrc) range from $0.24 to $550.05. The sample is also diverse with respect to
analyst following and institutional holdings. NumEst is the average of 12 monthly observa-
tions (January through December, 1999) of the number of analysts with end-of-Þscal-year
earnings forecast for the current year in I/B/E/S. While the mean of NumEst is 8.81, it
ranges from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 40.18. The percentage institutional holdings
from Value Line Investment Survey (InstHol) ranges from 0.23% to 99.59%.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the MRR, HASAB, and HASR measures of
information asymmetry. The mean MRR measure, or the permanent component of the
relative spread, is 0.07368 percent. The mean daily closing prices (AvgPrc) for the stocks in
our sample is $26.68, which means that the permanent component of the dollar spread for
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the average stock is about 2 cents.10 The estimates of MRR for seven stocks are negative.
While there is nothing in the estimation to constrain the information asymmetry measure
from being negative, it is unclear how to interpret these estimates. The negative measures
do not aﬀect our results as our Þndings are practically identical with and without these seven
stocks.
The mean of the HASAB measure in our sample is 0.391; it decreases with AvgCap and
increases with StdRet.11 HASAB also seems to increase, although not monotonically, with
MedTurn (the median daily turnover of the stock). This is perhaps driven by the way the
HASAB measure, expressed in standard deviation per hour, is calculated: it is the square
root of the estimated variance per event multiplied by the number of events over the sample
period and divided by the number of hours. Since many of the events are trades, it is not
surprising that the measure increases with MedTurn.12
2.2 Methodology
The Þrst test we run examines whether cross-sectional diﬀerences in MRR, HASAB, and
HASR reßect diﬀerences in information asymmetry about future cash ßows. Since we do
not have a way to directly measure information asymmetry (which is one of the reasons
econometric methodologies that use trade data became so popular in the Þrst place), we
focus instead on uncertainty about future cash ßows. The logic behind the test is that the
greater the uncertainty about future cash ßow, the more room (and incentives) there is for
investors to acquire private information and trade on it proÞtably. A theoretical treatment
10Table 2 in Madhavan et al. (1997) shows a mean measure of about 3 cents. It seems reasonable that
our estimates are lower considering that Madhavan et al. use 1990 data while our sample period is 1999.
11The VMA could not converge for eight stocks in our sample: ADOG, FOBB, NRG, OAK, OMNI, RIT,
SHLR, and YANB. They are eliminated from the sample for the tests involving the HASAB and HASR
measures
12The mean of the absolute measure that we report (0.391) is very similar to the one reported by Hasbrouck
(0.412). The mean of our relative measure is 16.17%, which is about half of the mean reported by Hasbrouck.
While his sample consisted of NYSE/AMEX stocks in the third quarter of 1989, our sample includes both
NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq stocks in 1999. For the 1413 Nasdaq stocks in our sample, the estimate of HASR
is 10.19%, while for the NYSE/AMEX stocks it is 21.90%, which is closer to the magnitude reported by
Hasbrouck. Our results indicate that the magnitude of the trade-correlated component remained in 1999 as
it was in 1989, while the proportion of the variation due to trades decreased relative to the overall variability
of the eﬃcient price.
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of the information environment of analysts is provided by Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens
(1998). They show that an increase in private information about the Þrm, ceteris paribus,
will increase the dispersion of analysts forecasts.
We use two deÞnitions of dispersion in analysts forecasts of future earnings to represent
uncertainty about future cash ßows: the standard deviation of analysts forecasts (StdEst)
and the coeﬃcient of variation (CoefEst), which a-priori has the appeal of a normalized
measure that may perform better in a cross-sectional analysis.13 Monthly observations for
the standard deviation and the mean of analysts earnings forecasts for the upcoming end-
of-Þscal-year are taken from I/B/E/S. StdEst is the simple average of the monthly standard
deviation observations for all months in 1999, and CoefEst is the ratio of StdEst to the
absolute value of the average monthly mean observations. The monthly observations of the
standard deviation of the forecasts in I/B/E/S (as well as the number of estimates) seem
to depend on the amount of time to the end-of-Þscal-year. However, since we use twelve
consecutive months of data, the average should have similar properties across Þrms with
diﬀerent end-of-Þscal-year dates.
We also use two proxies for uncertainty about future cash ßows based on past earnings
information. The Þrst is the earning predictability measure provided by Value Line Invest-
ment Survey (VLPred). This variable, available for 2081 stocks in our sample, is derived
from the standard deviation of percentage changes in quarterly earnings over an eight-year
period, with special adjustments for negative observations and observations around zero.
VLPred takes the values 1 to 100, where higher values are associated with less variability
of past earnings and hence higher predictability of future earnings. We also compute the
standard deviation of past annual earnings from COMPUSTAT using the Þve years prior
to 1999 (StdEPS).14 The idea behind both measures is that higher past earnings variability
13We also used the diﬀerence between the high and the low forecasts as an additional deÞnition of uncer-
tainty about future cash ßow. The results using this deÞnition were very similar to the results using the
standard deviation of earnings forecasts, and are therefore omitted for brevity.
14We repeated the analysis with the standard deviation of annual earnings computed using Þve years that
include 1999. The results were very similar to those obtained using StdEPS.
13
makes it more likely that future earnings cannot be predicted with great precision (allowing
more room for private information production and proÞtable informed trading).
We then estimate regressions with the information asymmetry measures as dependent
variables and the proxies for uncertainty about future cash ßows as independent variables.
This econometric speciÞcation attests to an underlying assumption that we make when us-
ing the analysts forecasts and past earnings proxies in the cross-sectional test. Intuitively,
variables that explicitly incorporate information about the Þrms earnings (or their expecta-
tions) are a-priori more tightly connected to the Þrms future cash ßows than measures that
do not use such direct information (like the estimated price impact measures), and therefore
should be the independent variables in the regressions.
We estimate these regressions using OLS with Whites Heteroskedasticity-consistent stan-
dard errors. A potential econometric problem with this speciÞcation for the two proxies that
use analysts forecasts is that the dispersion in forecasts can be endogenous.15 In other words,
the amount of time analysts spend on producing their estimates (which may aﬀect the dis-
persion), the number of estimates or the frequency of their update may be inßuenced by how
much proÞt can be made from this information. The proÞt opportunity, in turn, depends
on the permanent price impact of tradesthe same permanent price impact that the econo-
metric methodologies estimate and we use as a dependent variable. This rationale suggests
that the dispersion of analysts forecasts may be correlated with the error term, causing OLS
to be inconsistent. To examine this potential problem, we also estimate the cross-sectional
relation using two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) and conduct Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests.16
15This is not a problem with the proxies that use actual earnings data since it is hard to imagine how the
permanent price impact of trades can aﬀect the Þrms earnings per share.
16See Wu (1973), Hausman (1978), and Davidson and MacKinnon (1989) for a discussion of this test. Using
data in COMPUSTAT and CRSP, we construct six instruments for the dispersion in analysts forecasts. The
Þrst instrument is the log standard deviation of EPS for the Þve years prior to 1999 (available for 2845 Þrms
in our sample). The second instrument is the one year lagged EPS growth (percentage change in EPS from
1997 to 1998), using the absolute value of EPS in the denominator to maintain consistent signs when EPS
is negative (available for 2822 Þrms in our sample). The motivation for this instrument is that growth Þrms
are associated with more uncertainty about future earnings. The third instrument is the average absolute
value of quarterly sales growth in 1999 from COMPUSTAT (available for 2774 Þrms in our sample). This is
a measure of the magnitude of change in the Þrms operations that presumably is correlated with uncertainty
about its sales and earnings potential. The fourth instrument is the number of days with listing records
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The choice of control variables to add to the regressions is guided by the proxies we use
for future cash ßows uncertainty. More dispersion among analysts may reßect the nature
of the industry or the number of analysts that typically follow Þrms in a speciÞc industry.
Therefore, we add to the regressions a set of 2-digit SIC dummies to control for industry
eﬀects. To relate our measures of uncertainty about future cash ßows to the information
asymmetry measures we need to control for public information, and we (partially) do it by
including the standard deviation of daily returns in 1999 from CRSP as a control variable.
Similarly, there are more public information events (e.g., news articles) about larger Þrms.
So, we add a second control for public information ßow by including AvgCap, the average
market capitalization in 1999 from CRSP (in log form).
Two other controls are motivated by the market microstructure literature. First, the
impact of informed trading on prices diminishes as the amount of liquidity trading or normal
trading increases (see, for example, Kyle, 1985; Easley and OHara, 1987). Hence, we want
to hold constant the amount of liquidity trading when we compare across Þrms. As a proxy
for normal trading, we use the median daily turnover (daily number of shares traded over the
number of shares outstanding) in 1999 from CRSP (MedTurn). The median is less sensitive
to informational shocks that generate a lot of trading, and therefore is a better description of
normal volume.17 Lastly, we use dummies for the three primary markets (NYSE, AMEX,
and Nasdaq) to control for diﬀerences in the manner specialists or market makers set prices
in these markets. The motivation behind this control is that on the NYSE, for example,
the price continuity requirement aﬀects the way in which specialists change prices, and this
may be picked up by the spread decomposition and variance decomposition procedures (for
in CRSP, which is a measure of the maturity of the Þrm. Presumably, it is easier to estimate the future
earnings of more mature Þrms. The Þfth instrument is the log number of SIC codes that are associated with
the businesses of the Þrm (available for 2751 Þrms in our sample). Firms comprised of more businesses may
be more diﬃcult for analysts to evaluate, and this should increase the dispersion of the forecasts. The sixth
instrument is the dividend payout ratio for 1999 (available for 2685 Þrms in our sample). The idea behind
this instrument is that the more money is paid out, the less money is spent of new projects and therefore
the less uncertainty there is about earnings.
17We use median turnover in log form, and add a small constant (0.000001) to the raw data before making
the transformation to be able to accommodate stocks with zero median turnover.
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a discussion of this point see Hasbrouck, 1991a). Table 3 presents summary statistics for
the analysts forecasts and past earnings proxies, as well as correlations among the (log
transformed) proxies and control variables that are used in the regressions.
2.3 Results
Panel A of Table 4 presents the results of the cross-sectional regressions with the permanent
price impact of the order ßow innovation, MRR, as the dependent variable. Of the two
proxies using analysts forecasts, only StdEst is statistically signiÞcant, and it is negative.
This implies that information asymmetry is negatively related to uncertainty about future
cash ßows, which does not seem reasonable. As for the two proxies using past earnings,
VLPred is negative and (weakly) statistically signiÞcant. Here, the direction is consistent
with our expectation: higher predictability is associated with lower information asymmetry.
It is interesting to note that when StdEst and VLPred are together in the regression, StdEst
losses statistical signiÞcance and VLPred is strengthened.
Panel B of Table 4 presents the results with the trade-correlated component of the eﬃcient
price variance, HASAB, as the dependent variable. Here, StdEst is not signiÞcant, but
CoefEst is positive and statistically signiÞcant. The positive relation between HASAB and
uncertainty about future cash ßows is in line with its role as an information asymmetry
measure. VLPred is (weakly) statistically signiÞcant and negative, again consistent with our
expectation. Unlike the case with MRR, VLPred losses statistical signiÞcance when it is in
the regression with the analysts forecasts measure.18
Panel C of Table 4 presents the results using the amount of private information relative
to the total amount of information, HASR, as the dependent variable. None of the proxies
for uncertainty about future cash ßows is statistically signiÞcant when in the regression
alone. When CoefEst and StdEPS are together in the regression, CoefEst is negative but
only marginally signiÞcant. This result does not agree with our intuition about the relation
18The correlation between StdEst and VLPred is -0.406, and between CoefEst and VLPred is -0.571.
These do not seem high enough for multicollinearity to be the sole explanation for the loss of signiÞcance of
StdEst in the MRR regression and VLPred in the HASAB regression.
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between measures of information asymmetry and uncertainty about future cash ßows, but
seems too weak to be meaningful.19
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity tests and the coeﬃcients of the two-stage-least-
squares (2SLS) estimation are presented in Table 5. For all three measures, the exogeneity
tests are insigniÞcant (with very low chi-squared statistics). This gives us conÞdence that
the results of the OLS estimations provide an accurate picture of the relationships among
the variables.20
To summarize the results of the cross-sectional analysis: the only information asymmetry
measure that relates to both types of proxies (analysts forecasts and past earnings) in the
predicted direction is HASAB. MRR provides conßicting results that are diﬃcult to interpret,
and HASR is unrelated to any of the proxies.
3 FERC and FINC Analysis
3.1 Methodology
We use the same sample to perform a diﬀerent kind of cross-sectional analysis with two
proxies for the informativeness of prices about future earnings that were developed in the ac-
counting literature (see, Kothari, 1992; Kothari and Sloan, 1992; Collins, Kothari, Shanken,
and Sloan, 1994; Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin, 2001). Let rt = (Pt − Pt−1)/Pt−1 be
the current quarterly return and rt+τ be the return τ quarters ahead. Similarly, let ∆Et be
the current earnings-per-share change and ∆Et+τ be the earnings change τ quarters ahead,
where all earnings changes are scaled by the price at the beginning of the current quarter,
Pt−1. To measure stock price informativeness, we regress current stock returns on current
19Since HASR is a proportion, we also estimated the regressions with a logit transformation of HASR as
the dependent variable. The results were qualitatively similar to those reported in Panel C and are therefore
not presented here.
20We also conducted Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests with subsets of the six instruments to see how sensitive
are the results to the exact speciÞcation of the instruments. Similar results were found for all subsets except
in one case. In the regression of MRR on CoefEst, the test was signiÞcant when only two instruments were
included. Since other instruments were highly signiÞcant in the Þrst stage regression (where CoefEst is
regressed on the instruments), they were gradually added to the speciÞcation. As additional instruments
were added, however, the 2SLS coeﬃcient of CoefEst switched sign and the test became insigniÞcant.
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and future earnings changes:
rt = a+ b0∆Et +
X
τ
bτ∆Et+τ +
X
τ
cτrt+τ + ut (11)
Future stock returns are included among the regressors to control for the measurement error
problem described by Collins et al. (1994).
The two proxies for price informativeness are:
FERC ≡ X
τ
bτ (12)
FINC ≡ R2a+b0∆Et+Pτ bτ∆Et+τ+Pτ cτ rt+τ+ut −R2a+b0∆Et+ut (13)
FERC (Future Earnings Response Coeﬃcients) is deÞned as the sum of the coeﬃcients on
the future earnings changes, and FINC (Future earnings INCremental) is the incremental
explanatory power of the future earnings changes (given that current earnings are already in
the model). Both FERC and FINC are designed to detect the extent to which current stock
prices capitalize information about future earnings.
The general intuition behind using FERC and FINC to test the information asymmetry
measures is that the more trading on private information, holding constant the extent of
public information, the more informative are prices with respect to future earnings (for a
theoretical justiÞcation see, for example, Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). The need to con-
trol for public information arises since if we take the extreme case where all future cash
ßow information is revealed publicly, then both FERC and FINC will be at their maximum
but there will be no information asymmetry. However, once we control for public informa-
tion, the relation between trading on private information and FERC and FINC should be
monotonically increasing. This is true in particular since MRR and HASAB (or HASR) are
not just measures of information asymmetry, but rather measures of trading based on pri-
vate information that moves prices. Therefore, these measures directly relate to information
incorporation into prices and thus should be more tightly related to FERC and FINC.
Since we are interested in evaluating how much information about future earnings is in-
corporated into prices during our sample period, we use returns for the four calendar quarters
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in 1999. Our earnings data is taken from COMPUSTAT, and we have earnings up to and
including the second quarter of 2000. To be able to use all four quarterly return observa-
tions, we set τ=2 and estimate the information that is impounded into current prices about
earnings two quarters in the future. Since each Þrm has only four observation, we cannot
estimate FERC and FINC for individual Þrms. We group stocks with similar information
asymmetry measures and estimate for each group a common price informativeness proxy.
The motivation behind this procedure is that each group of stocks that have the same level
of informed trading (holding public information constant) should have similar FERC and
FINC estimates, and hence can be estimated together.
For example, to estimate FERC and FINC for the MRR measure, we sort all stocks
according to MRR and form 287 groups of ten stocks each.21 Each such group has approxi-
mately 40 Þrm-quarter observations that can be used for the estimation of FERC and FINC.
We estimate Equation (11) using OLS with Whites heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors. We then use the mean of the MRR coeﬃcients of stocks in each group (MRRG) to
represent the level of information asymmetry for the group. FERCMRR and FINCMRR are
computed according to (12) and (13). We perform separate estimations of Equation (11) for
groups formed by sorting on HASAB and HASR. We then use correlations to examine the re-
lationship between the price informativeness proxies and the group measures of information
asymmetry.
Ideally, one should control for cross-sectional diﬀerences in public information and noise
trading when looking at the relation between the information asymmetry measures and
the proxies for price informativeness. However, since we group stocks according to their
information asymmetry measure, we cannot simply use a regression and plug-in control
variables. The mean of the market capitalization (or the volatility of returns) of stocks
in a group has no real economic content. To exercise some control, we divide the stocks
into four categories. First, we sort the 2869 stocks according to their market capitalization.
21We dropped the seven stocks for which the MRR measure is negative. Inclusion of these stocks in the
groups does not materially aﬀect the results.
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We then separate them into two categories, Low AvgCap and High AvgCap, with equal
number of stocks. Each category is then sorted according to MedTurn and divided into two
equal categories, Low MedTurn and High MedTurn. This procedure produces four control
categories: High AvgCap and High MedTurn, High AvgCap and LowMedTurn, Low AvgCap
and High MedTurn, and Low AvgCap and Low MedTurn. Within each category, we sort
according to the information asymmetry measure, create 72 groups of ten stocks each, and
estimate FERC and FINC for the groups. We then compute the correlations separately for
each category. Such a structure provides (partial) control for public information and noise
trading. We use a similar procedure to control for public information and liquidity trading
with StdRet and MedTurn, respectively.
3.2 Results
The results of the FERC and FINC analysis are provided in Table 6. The predicted direction
is that more informed trading is associated with a higher degree of price informativeness,
which means larger magnitudes of FERC and FINC. The results of the unconditional analy-
sis, where we look at the correlations for the entire sample, seem to go the other way. MRR
has a negative correlation with FERC (-0.1003) that is statistically signiÞcant; HASAB is
negatively correlated with both FERC (-0.1419) and FINC (-0.1647), and both are statis-
tically diﬀerent from zero; and HASR is not signiÞcantly correlated with either FERC or
FINC.
The conditional analysis, where we sort the stocks into four categories according to two
conditioning variables, should lessen the inßuence of diﬀerences across stocks in the degree
of public information or the amount of liquidity trading. Panel B of Table 6 shows the con-
ditional analysis for the MRR measure. When the controls are average market capitalization
(AvgCap) and median turnover (MedTurn), MRR is negatively correlated with FERC, but
signiÞcantly so only for high MedTurn stocks. It is negatively correlated with FINC both
for the small, less actively-traded stocks, and for the large, actively-traded stocks. MRR
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in the two other categories is positively correlated with FINC, but these correlations are
not statistically diﬀerent from zero. When the controls are the standard deviation of daily
returns (StdRet) and MedTurn, none of the correlations is statistically diﬀerent from zero.
Panel C of Table 6 shows the conditional analysis for the HASAB measure. When
the controls are AvgCap and MedTurn, only one category (small, actively-traded stocks)
has correlations with FERC and FINC that are signiÞcantly diﬀerent from zero, and these
correlations are negative. When the controls are StdRet and MedTurn, the only correlation
that is statically diﬀerent from zero (and negative) is in the High StdRet and Low MedTurn
category. Panel D of Table 6 presents the conditional analysis for the HASR measure. There
are both positive and negative correlations of HASR with FERC and FINC, but none is
signiÞcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The bottom line of the FERC and FINC analysis is that despite our expectation that
more trading by investors who are informed about future cash ßows would increase the
informativeness of prices with respect to future earnings, all information asymmetry measures
seem to be negatively correlated with the proxies for price informativeness.22
4 Event Study: Russell 1000 Reconstitution
In this section we investigate whether changes in information about the Þrm are necessary
for the information asymmetry measures to change, holding constant the amount of liquidity
trading. In principle, only one example where the information asymmetry measures change
without corresponding changes in information about the Þrm is required to show that the
necessary link does not exist. The Russell 1000 index reconstitution provides a suitable
22We have used one additional proxy for public information in the conditional analysis of HASAB. The
VAR decomposition of the random-walk variance also produces a non-trade-correlated component that can be
viewed as an estimate of public information. There is no mechanical relation between the public information
component and HASAB (though both components make up the eﬃcient price variance). We sorted the
stocks Þrst according to the public information component and then according to MedTurn to get four
control categories similar to those that are presented in Panel C where AvgCap or StdRet are used to
control for public information. HASAB had both positive and negative correlations with FERC and FINC
in the control categories, but none was statistically diﬀerent from zero.
21
environment for constructing such a test.23
The Russell 1000 index is comprised of the top 1000 Þrms based on market capitalization.
Membership in the Russell 1000 index is determined strictly by market capitalization rather
than by subjective opinion or committee decision.24 While the market capitalization of Þrms
ßuctuates with prices, the index is changed only once a year in a reconstitution process.
All Þrms are ranked based on their market capitalization at the end of the last trading day
in May. The top 1000 Þrms constitute the new Russell 1000 index, the next 2000 Þrms the
Russell 2000 index, and the Þrms in both indexes are combined to make the Russell 3000
index. During June, Frank Russell Company issues a list of Þrms to be added and deleted
from the indexes. The new indexes become eﬀective July 1.
The Russell indexes are popular benchmarks of stock market performance in the United
States. In 2001, an estimated 117 billion dollars in investment were indexed to the Russell
1000, 2000, and 3000 indexes.25 Therefore, the annual reconstitution event can generate
buying and selling pressures on stocks that are added to or deleted from the indexes. On
the other hand, since membership in the Russell 1000 index is solely based on the market
capitalization of a Þrm, which is publicly known, additions to and deletions from the index
convey no new information about the Þrm. Thus controlling for the amount of noise trading,
the measures should not change if they arise solely from private information about the
future cash ßows of the Þrms. If these measures are aﬀected by other factors, like changes
in the characteristics of investors who trade them, we would detect changes around the
reconstitution event.
It is clear that the Russell reconstitution event is fairly transparent, and it is possible to
23For other papers that examine changes to equity indexes (in particular the S&P 500 index) see Harris
and Gurel (1986), Shleifer (1986), Jain (1987), Dhillon and Johnson (1991), and Lynch and Mendenhall
(1997).
24Excluded from all Russell indexes are foreign Þrms, limited partnerships, limited liability companies,
royalty trusts, closed-ended investment management companies, ADRs, preferred stocks, pink-slipped com-
panies, OTC bulletin board companies, and warrants and rights. The indexes also exclude stocks trading at
below $1.
25This estimate is taken from a report by Investment Technology Group, Inc. on the 2001 Russell index
reconstitution.
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predict prior to the last day in May which stocks are more likely to be added or deleted. In
fact, Þrms like Investment Technology Group, Inc. oﬀer the service of predicting the changes
in order to assist fund managers who wish to begin rebalancing their portfolios in advance
of the announced index changes. Such behavior will bias the results against Þnding any
change between the estimated information asymmetry measures just before the end of May
and immediately after July 1. Thus any eﬀect that we detect is likely to be an underestimate
of the real change in the measures.
4.1 Sample and Methodology
The sample is constructed from a list, obtained from the Frank Russell Company, of 157
stocks that were added to the Russell 1000 index in 1999 and 103 stocks that were deleted
from the index.26 We restrict the sample to common stocks (for compatibility with the
cross-sectional tests) with data from April 1 through mid-July. In order to make sure that
no major corporate event occurs at the same time that can confound the results, we use the
CRSP database and Dow Jones Interactive to identify Þrms that were involved in mergers
around the time of the Russell reconstitution. We eliminate from the sample Þrms about
which we Þnd news reports discussing the mergers during May, June, and July 1999. The
Þnal sample consists of 130 additions and 87 deletions.
Table 7 presents summary statistics on the Þrms used in the event study. There seems
to be a slight increase in mean price between May 28 (the last trading day in May) and July
1 (when the new composition of the index takes eﬀect). Average turnover increases slightly
from the last week of May to the Þrst week of July for both samples, but the cross-sectional
mean of the average number of trades decreases for the addition sample. Dollar spreads and
percentage spreads decrease for both additions and deletions.
Our event study methodology is an adaptation of standard speciÞcations.27 Let φi,τ
26The preliminary list of the changes was published by the Frank Russell Company on June 11 and the
Þnal list was published on July 7 (though the new composition of the index took eﬀect on July 1). To
construct the sample, we eliminate 12 stocks that were not present in both the preliminary and Þnal lists.
27See, for example, Schipper and Thompson (1983) and Thompson (1985).
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denote the information asymmetry measure for stock i estimated over time interval τ ∈
{pre, post} (i.e., either the pre-event interval or the post-event interval). The simplest spec-
iÞcation assumes that the information asymmetry measure can be described as the sum of
a stock-speciÞc unconditional mean (µi), an event eﬀect (α), and an error term (²i,τ ):
φi,τ = µi + αδi,τ + ²i,τ (14)
where δi,τ is an indicator variable that takes the value zero in the pre-event interval and one
in the post-event interval, and ²i,τ is assumed i.i.d and normally distributed with mean zero
and variance σ2i /2.
The theoretical models that examine the price impact of trades in the context of informa-
tion asymmetry also demonstrate how the price impact of trades can be aﬀected by changes
to normal or liquidity trading (i.e., volume due to uninformed traders that is unrelated to
information events). A formulation that takes normal trading into account can be written
as:
φi,τ = µi + αδi,τ + βVi,τ + ²i,τ (15)
where Vi,τ is a proxy for the amount of normal volume.
By examining diﬀerences between the pre- and post-event intervals, we can eliminate the
Þrm-speciÞc mean. Equation 14 can be written in terms of diﬀerences as:
∆φi ≡ φi,post − φi,pre = α+ ²i (16)
where ²i is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ
2
i . Similarly, the formulation
in terms of diﬀerences of Equation 15 is:
∆φi = α+ β∆Vi + ²i (17)
where ∆Vi ≡ Vi,post − Vi,pre. Testing that the Russell 1000 reconstitution event aﬀects the
information asymmetry measures is therefore equivalent to testing whether the intercept (α)
of either Equation 16 or Equation 17 is statistically diﬀerent from zero.
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If the event aﬀects the level of prices but does not aﬀect the information asymmetry
environment, it may be preferable to estimate the MRR measure using changes in dollar
prices rather than changes to the logarithmic transformation of prices. For consistency
with the previous sections, we estimate the same information asymmetry measures, but
also present the results of MRR$, which is the permanent price impact of the order ßow
innovation developed in Madhavan et al. (1997) in dollar terms.28 We use one week as the
length of the interval over which the information asymmetry measures are estimated. Since
the ranking of Þrms for the reconstitution is based on the closing prices on May 28, we use
the week ending May 28 as the pre-event interval. Similarly, since the eﬀective date of the
changes is July 1, we use Þve trading days beginning July 1 as the post-event interval.29
For start, we assume that the error terms are identically distributed across stocks and
Equation 16 is estimated as a simple t-test. We also use the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed
rank test to perform the analysis under less restrictive assumptions. Then, Equation 17 is
estimated using OLS with Whites heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
We use two proxies for the amount of normal volume: the average daily turnover and
the average daily number of trades in the interval. We fully acknowledge that these may
not be perfect controls. The analysis of both the addition and deletion samples, however,
provides us with an internal check on the eﬀects of liquidity trading. This, because most
stocks in our sample that were added to the Russell 1000 index (109 out of 130) were deleted
from the Russell 2000 index, and all stocks that were deleted from the Russell 1000 index
were added to the Russell 2000. Say we believe that a move from the Russell 1000 to the
Russell 2000 index increases the amount of liquidity trading (perhaps more passive funds
28While we conduct a cross-sectional analysis of ∆φi, Equation 16 and Equation 17 show how the Þrm-
speciÞc mean eﬀect is eliminated. Cross-sectional diﬀerences can therefore be accommodated by the Þrm-
speciÞc error term ²i.
29Unlike the pre-event interval, the Þve days beginning July 1 do not include all days of the week (due to
Independence Day). Since there may be a day-of-the-week eﬀect in the estimated information asymmetry
measures (see, for example, Foster and Viswanathan, 1993), we also conducted the analysis with the Þrst
Þve days in July that comprise a full set of the days of the week (dates 1, 2, 6, 7, and 12). The results
obtained were very similar to the results using the Þrst Þve trading days in July, and are therefore omitted
for brevity of exposition.
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follow the Russell 2000 index). If the proxy for normal volume is not good enough, some of
the increase in liquidity trading will be captured by the intercept, making it negative. At the
same time, stocks that move from the Russell 2000 to the Russell 1000 should experience a
decrease in liquidity trading. For them, insuﬃcient control for liquidity trading will result in
a positive intercept. So, opposite results for the addition and deletion samples is consistent
with insuﬃcient adjustment for the eﬀects of liquidity trading. If the intercepts of the two
samples have the same sign, the results are most likely not due to lack of control for changes
in normal trading.
4.2 Results
Panel A of Table 8 presents the results of the event study for the addition sample. The
t-tests indicate that the decrease in the mean measure between the pre- and post-event in-
tervals is statistically diﬀerent from zero for MRR$, MRR, and HASAB. The non-parametric
Wilcoxon signed rank test is also highly signiÞcant. Normalizing by the pre-event magnitude
of the measures, the median percentage changes in MRR$, MRR, and HASAB are −29.67%,
−31.08%, and −21.86%, respectively. The fourth column of Panel A shows the intercept
from the regression with AvgTurn as a proxy for normal volume and the sixth column shows
the intercept from the regression with AvgTrd as a proxy for normal volume. The intercepts
in the regressions with MRR$, MRR, and HASAB are all negative and statistically signif-
icant, while the volume variables are not signiÞcant in these regressions. The situation is
reversed in the regressions with HASR: the intercept is not statistically signiÞcant, but the
volume variables are signiÞcant and negative.
The results for the deletion sample are presented in Panel B of Table 8. The mean
diﬀerence between the pre- and post-event measures is negative, and the t-test conÞrms
that it is statistically diﬀerent from zero for MRR, and HASAB. The Wilcoxon signed rank
test points to the same conclusion. The non-parametric test also conÞrms that the MRR$
information asymmetry measure decreased, though the t-test is not statistically signiÞcant.
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A closer inspection reveals that the insigniÞcant t-test is the result of one positive outlier
that is more than 7 standard deviations from the mean. Eliminating this outlier results in a
very signiÞcant t-test. Normalizing by the pre-event magnitude of the measures, the median
percentage changes in MRR$, MRR, and HASAB are −22.99%, −29.44%, and −7.76%,
respectively. The intercepts of the regressions with the proxies for normal volume tell the
same story: signiÞcant negative intercepts for MRR and HASAB (and also for MRR$ without
the outlier).
The results from both the addition and deletion samples point to the same conclusion:
the Russell 1000 reconstitution event is associated with a decrease in the information asym-
metry measures (with the exception of HASR). This cannot be due to a change in private
information about the future cash ßows of the Þrms since the only criterion used for the
reconstitutionmarket capitalization on May 28is public information. The Þnding of a
decrease in the measures for both the addition and deletion samples also rules out an ex-
planation based on changes in liquidity trading. As the discussion in Section 4.1 points out,
even if the proxies for normal volume are not perfect, a change in normal trading would
produce opposite results in the addition and deletion samples.
The decrease in the measures is consistent with an explanation that postulates changes in
uncertainty about the investor population (in the spirit of Saar 2000a, 2000b). Uncertainty
about whether a stock will end up in the Russell 1000 index or the Russell 2000 index during
the last week of May creates uncertainty with respect to the composition of the investors
(e.g., index funds) who trade the stock. While some fund managers could be trading ahead
of time based on a certain assessment as to which stocks will switch indexes, others could
be trading based on a diﬀerent assessment or waiting until the new composition is made
known. This increased uncertainty for stocks that may be added to or deleted from the
index increases the price impact of trades and is picked up by the information asymmetry
measures. In the post-event interval, there is less uncertainty about the investor population
since the changes to the index are announced and therefore the permanent price impact of
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trades decreases.
We conducted several tests to evaluate the robustness of our results. First, we used inter-
val lengths other than Þve days. Two-day intervals displayed a similar signiÞcant decrease in
the information asymmetry measures MRR$, MRR, and HASAB.30 We also used one-month
intervals and obtained results similar to those presented in Table 8 (i.e., a statistically sig-
niÞcant decrease in MRR$, MRR, and HASAB).31
Since MRR$ and MRR behave in a similar fashion, it seems unlikely that the results
are due to possible changes in the price level that may aﬀect the estimated measures due to
discreteness of the price gird. Nonetheless, we added the change in AvgPrc as a regressor to
the speciÞcation in Equation 17 to account for changes in the price level, and found that it
did not alter our results. We also used a dummy variable to examine whether the 21 stocks
that were added to the Russell 1000 index but were not previously in the Russell 2000 index
behave diﬀerently from the rest of the stocks. The coeﬃcient of the dummy variable was not
signiÞcant and similar results were obtained. For MRR$ and MRR, we repeated the tests
using only positive estimates and only estimates that were statistically diﬀerent from zero.
This was done to eliminate the inßuence of stocks that did not have suﬃcient amount of
trading to produce reliable estimates of the information asymmetry measures. The results
were similar to those reported in Table 8.
Lastly, we constructed a matched sample of stocks based on both market capitalization
and average turnover in April 1999.32 The motivation behind constructing the matched
sample was to investigate whether the Russell 1000 reconstitution event coincided with a
market-wide change in liquidity that could have aﬀected the estimates of the information
asymmetry measures of all stocks. Unlike the results for the addition and deletion samples,
30We used May 27 and 28 for the pre-event interval and July 1 and 2 for the post-event interval. Both
intervals are comprised of the days Thursday and Friday, and hence the results are not due to a day-of-the-
week eﬀect.
31The only diﬀerence was with respect to the HASR measure, which was signiÞcantly negative in the
deletion sample and signiÞcantly positive in the addition sample.
32The universe of stocks that was used for the matching consisted of all common stocks in the CRSP
database with information from April 1 to July 12 that were not added to or deleted from the Russell 1000
index.
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there was no overwhelming signiÞcant decrease in the information asymmetry measures in
the matched sample. The only statistically signiÞcant change was a decrease in HASAB in
the addition-matched sample. The decrease in the matched sample, however, was smaller in
magnitude than the decrease in the addition sample, and a paired t-test (as well as a Wilcoxon
signed rank test) showed that the diﬀerence between them was statistically signiÞcant.
5 Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to examine whether spread decomposition and variance de-
composition methodologies developed in the market microstructure literature to produce
measures of information asymmetry about the future cash ßows of Þrms in fact do so. We
separate this task into two parts. In the Þrst, we investigate whether cross-sectional diﬀer-
ences in information asymmetry about future cash ßows are suﬃcient to produce diﬀerences
in the estimated measures. In the second part, we use the Russell 1000 index reconstitution
to look at whether changes in information asymmetry are necessary to produce changes in
the estimated measures.
The cross-sectional analysis is important since if we conclude that these measures are
related in the appropriate direction to our proxies for future cash ßow uncertainty and price
informativeness, then these measures can be useful for detecting changes in the information
asymmetry environment. Even if this is the case, however, the measures are vulnerable to
the claim that other things in the economic environment can cause them to change, and
therefore changes in these measures would always be open to alternative interpretations.
This is the motivation for the second part of the analysis. It is very diﬃcult to prove that
nothing but information asymmetry about future cash ßows aﬀects the estimated measures
since it requires to consider every possible scenario. To disprove this claim, however, requires
only one example. We use the Russell 1000 index reconstitution because it provides a clean
experiment of a change to the composition of the investor population without any new
information about the Þrm.
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Already the results of the cross-sectional and price informativeness analyses, however,
cast doubt on the reliability of the measures as depictions of information asymmetry about
future cash ßows. The MRR measure does not seem to relate to uncertainty about future
cash ßows in a consistent fashion. It is negatively related to both the dispersion of analysts
forecasts and to price informativeness, exactly the opposite of what we would expect. It is
negatively related to a measure of the predictability of earnings based on past data, as it
should be, but the mixed results indicate that this measure probably cannot be used reliably
to represent information asymmetry about future cash ßows.
While the HASAB and HASR measures are both based on the variance decomposition
methodology, they turn out to have diﬀerent properties. In particular, it does not seem as
if the HASR measure represents the phenomena we associate with information asymmetry
about future cash ßows. It may be that the amount of private information relative to all
information is not what aﬀects the market, but rather the amount of private information per
se. HASAB shows promise in the cross-sectional analysis in that it has the predicted relations
with two proxies for uncertainty about future cash ßows, one using analysts forecasts and
another using past earnings variability. The picture changes when we consider the price
informativeness analysis, where more informed trading according to HASAB is associated
with less information in prices about future earnings. This contradictory result weakens our
belief in the usefulness of the measure, but the HASAB measure still seems to perform better
than MRR.
One could ask why researchers do not use proxies for uncertainty about future cash ßows
instead of the spread or variance components if indeed these proxies are more strongly asso-
ciated with information asymmetry about future cash ßows. We believe that the abundance
of trading data and the fact that the market microstructure measures can be estimated for
very short periods or for portions of the day greatly contributed to the popularity of these
measures. Past earnings data or even analysts forecasts cannot be measured at Þne intervals,
nor do they allow the ßexibility of intraday data in establishing the information environment
30
for portions of the day or hours around a corporate event. By looking at the relation be-
tween the market microstructure measures and proxies for future cash ßows uncertainty or
price informativeness (when those can be obtained), we are able to examine whether the
former reßect information asymmetry about future cash ßows and can serve as a convenient
substitute for the latter.
The design of the event study was guided by our conjecture that other things besides
future cash ßow information indeed aﬀect the information asymmetry measures. This con-
jecture is supported by our Þndings: the MRR (both in dollar and percentage terms) and
the HASAB measures decrease signiÞcantly around the reconstitution event, and this cannot
be attributed to mere changes in uninformed or liquidity trading.
Callahan, Lee, and Yohn (1997) claim that the information asymmetry risk faced by
a dealer, presumably the one reßected in the permanent price impact of trades, is not a
measure of the long-term fundamental risk of investing in a particular Þrm. Market makers
are concerned with order imbalances over very short horizons (often less than an hour), and
these need not correspond to the creation of new information about the Þrm or the trading
by investors with special knowledge about the Þrm. It may be that the kind of information
that is picked up by spread decomposition or variance decomposition procedures is not as
permanent as we would like to think and can arise from many reasons that give rise to
imbalances in the order ßow. Even if information about the Þrm is one cause for these
order ßow imbalances, its eﬀects may be miniscule relative to other factor that inßuence
minute-by-minute trading.
This may also explain the better performance of HASAB (as opposed to MRR) in the
cross-sectional analysis. If information about the Þrm indeed aﬀects prices in a more per-
manent fashion than other factors, then the better we are at identifying permanent price
changes, the stronger will be the connection between the measures and future cash ßow infor-
mation. The methodology that generates HASAB uses Þve lags of price changes to identify
permanent eﬀects. The econometric model that generates the MRR measure essentially uses
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only one lag. As such, the MRR measure may incorporate more of the other factors that
aﬀect trading, reducing its eﬀectiveness in identifying information about the Þrm. Further
increasing the number of lags in the variance decomposition methodology, while preventing
its use for thinly traded stock, may increase its eﬀectiveness. This is especially true in future
work that will use prices quoted in decimals, as the reduced tick size dramatically increased
in the number of quote changes.
Our Þndings raise doubts as to the strength of the conclusions one can draw when using
the measures of information asymmetry produced by spread decomposition and variance
decomposition techniques. While some of our results are consistent with the traditional use
of these measures, the overall weight of the evidence points to a conclusion that measures
based on the permanent price impact of trades may not be suitable for describing information
asymmetry about the Þrm.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics for the Cross-sectional Sample
The cross-sectional sample is constructed by including all common stocks with information in the CRSP database between January 4 and December 31, 1999
(the sample period) that have at least one analyst covering them in the I/B/E/S database. The sample is further restricted to stocks with information in TAQ,
COMPUSTAT, and Value Line Investment Survey. The following variables are calculated for each stock over the sample period using data in CRSP: AvgCap is
the average daily market capitalization (the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the daily closing price), StdRet is the standard deviation of daily returns,
MedTurn is the median daily turnover (the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding), AvgVol is the average daily number of shares
traded, and AvgPrc is the average daily closing price of the stock. From the TAQ database, AvgTrd is calculated as the average daily number of trades, and
%Sprd is the average percentage spread (the bid-ask spread divided by the midquote). NumEst is the average of 12 monthly observations in 1999 of the number
of analysts with end-of-fiscal-year earnings forecasts for the current year in I/B/E/S. InstHol is the percentage of shares held by institutions from Value Line
Investment Survey. The table presents summary statistics for the entire sample, as well as means for four equal groups sorted by AvgCap, StdRet, and MedTurn,
respectively.
AvgCap
(in million $)
StdRet
(in %)
MedTurn
(in %)
AvgVol
(in 100s)
AvgPrc
(in $)
AvgTrd %Sprd
(in %)
NumEst InstHol
(in %)
Entire Mean 4,414.29 3.62 0.50 5,128.72 26.68 442.67 1.25 8.81 50.38
Sample Median 563.45 3.30 0.31 1,617.20 20.93 117.56 0.89 6.52 51.12
Std. Dev. 19,183.64 1.70 0.65 13,875.91 24.50 1,584.67 1.17 6.77 22.72
Min. 6.05 0.50 0.00 11.00 0.24 3.03 0.07 2.00 0.23
Max. 446,161.27 25.73 15.64 280,833.61 550.05 29,809.45 19.95 40.18 99.59
Obs. 2,876 2,876 2,876 2,876 2,876 2,876 2,876 2,876 2,876
Means Q1 (Low) 106.38 4.47 0.37 831.57 10.18 76.21 2.62 3.87 36.60
For Q2 354.09 3.90 0.51 1,833.17 18.55 163.85 1.27 5.78 48.10
AvgCap Q3 1,047.68 3.25 0.54 3,007.62 29.25 248.40 0.74 8.59 55.68
Groups Q4 (High) 16,149.00 2.86 0.59 14,842.49 48.73 1,282.20 0.38 16.99 61.16
Means Q1 (Low) 7,428.85 1.90 0.21 3,661.77 36.65 223.66 0.68 10.37 51.58
for Q2 7,212.71 2.80 0.31 5,972.29 28.43 419.18 0.99 9.97 56.30
StdRet Q3 2,124.60 3.90 0.53 5,715.42 21.72 489.40 1.41 8.42 52.55
Groups Q4 (High) 890.99 5.89 0.96 5,165.39 19.92 638.43 1.93 6.48 41.11
Means Q1 (Low) 3,697.73 2.84 0.11 1,247.20 21.77 82.03 1.80 5.91 37.07
for Q2 5,639.16 3.00 0.24 3,781.44 26.29 222.07 1.18 9.51 52.71
MedTurn Q3 4,832.07 3.67 0.42 5,163.21 27.42 326.38 1.13 9.87 57.68
Groups Q4 (High) 3,488.18 4.97 1.23 10,323.00 31.24 1,140.19 0.91 9.96 54.07
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Table 2
Summary Statistics for the Information Asymmetry Measures
Three measures of information asymmetry, MRR, HASAB, and HASR, are estimated for each of the stocks in the
cross-sectional sample using intraday transactions data (trades and quotes) between January 4 and December 31,
1999 from the TAQ database. MRR is the permanent price impact of the order flow innovation developed in
Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997). HASAB is the trade-correlated component of the efficient price
variance (in standard deviation per hour form), and HASR is the trade-correlated component relative to the total
efficient price variance, both introduced in Hasbrouck (1991b). The table presents summary statistics for the entire
sample, as well as means for four equal groups sorted by AvgCap (average daily market capitalization), StdRet (the
standard deviation of daily returns), and MedTurn (the median daily turnover), respectively.
MRR HASAB HASR
Entire Mean 0.0737 0.3907 0.1617
Sample Median 0.0513 0.3685 0.1490
Std. Dev. 0.0768 0.1970 0.0938
Min.
-0.0102 0.0483 0.0008
Max. 1.0569 2.2993 0.8836
Obs. 2,876 2,868 2,868
Means Q1 (Low) 0.1168 0.4717 0.1515
for Q2 0.0813 0.3993 0.1541
AvgCap Q3 0.0629 0.3488 0.1639
Groups Q4 (High) 0.0336 0.3437 0.1770
Means Q1 (Low) 0.0736 0.2788 0.1997
for Q2 0.0819 0.3693 0.1907
StdRet Q3 0.0748 0.4330 0.1512
Groups Q4 (High) 0.0645 0.4817 0.1051
Means Q1 (Low) 0.1314 0.3683 0.1949
for Q2 0.0766 0.3867 0.1836
MedTurn Q3 0.0590 0.4138 0.1643
Groups Q4 (High) 0.0277 0.3939 0.1040
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Table 3
Summary Statistics for Future Cash Flows Uncertainty Proxies
We use as proxies for uncertainty about future cash flows two definitions of dispersion of analysts' earnings
forecasts: log of the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts (StdEst) and log of the coefficient of variation of
analysts' forecasts (CoefEst). I/B/E/S provides monthly observations of the standard deviation and mean of the
analysts' forecasts for the current end-of-fiscal-year. StdEst is the simple average of the monthly standard
deviation observations for all months in 1999, and CoefEst is the ratio of the average standard deviation to the
average absolute mean forecast. We also use two proxies for uncertainty about future cash flows based on past
earnings: VLPred is an earning predictability measure provided by Value Line Investment Survey derived from
the standard deviation of percentage changes in quarterly earnings over an eight-year period, and StdEPS is log
of the standard deviation of annual earnings for the five years prior to 1999. Panel A presents summary statistics
for the entire sample (before taking the log transformations), as well as for four equal groups sorted by AvgCap
(average daily market capitalization), StdRet (the standard deviation of daily returns), and MedTurn (the median
daily turnover), respectively. Panel B presents pairwise correlations and p-values of the four future cash flows
uncertainty proxies and the three control variables used in the cross-sectional regressions (where LAvgCap and
LMedTurn are the log transformations of AvgCap and MedTurn, respectively). The two-sided p-values for the
asymptotic test of zero correlations are shown in parentheses. "**" indicates significance at the 1% level and
"*" indicates significance at the 5% level.
Panel A: Summary statistics of untransformed variables
StdEst CoefEst VLPred StdEPS
Entire Mean 0.0882 0.3842 47.7827 0.9176
Sample Median 0.0490 0.0410 45.0000 0.5600
Std. Dev. 0.1265 7.0859 28.3613 1.2713
Min. 0.0008 0.0008 5.0000 0.0100
Max. 2.5400 363.0000 100.0000 22.0300
Obs. 2,876 2,876 2,072 2,845
Means Q1 (Low) 0.0948 1.0437 33.4708 0.6904
for Q2 0.0862 0.1973 40.5537 0.8333
AvgCap Q3 0.0790 0.1709 51.7693 0.8990
Groups Q4 (High) 0.0929 0.1249 59.6099 1.2466
Means Q1 (Low) 0.0809 0.0504 62.5261 0.9303
for Q2 0.0724 0.0818 51.1898 0.9590
StdRet Q3 0.0861 0.7715 38.9826 0.8787
Groups Q4 (High) 0.1134 0.6331 27.0140 0.9022
Means Q1 (Low) 0.0746 0.1347 54.4925 0.7259
for Q2 0.0769 0.1538 53.6217 0.8425
MedTurn Q3 0.0987 0.9287 45.4728 1.0325
Groups Q4 (High) 0.1027 0.3196 35.3902 1.0675
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Panel B: Unconditional correlations of transformed variables used in the regressions
Control Variables
StdEst
(p-value)
CoefEst
(p-value)
VLPred
(p-value)
StdEPS
(p-value)
LAvgCap
(p-value)
StdRet
(p-value)
LMedTurn
(p-value)
StdEst
_ 0.6748** -0.4057** 0.3733** -0.0672** 0.1149** 0.0489*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0119)
CoefEst
_ -0.5713** 0.1524** -0.3123** 0.4500** 0.1386**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
VLPred
_ -0.3557** 0.3813** -0.4090** -0.2190**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
StdEPS
_ 0.2125** -0.0266 0.1337**
(0.0000) (0.2050) (0.0000)
LAvgCap
_ -0.3794** 0.1722**
(0.0000) (0.0000)
StdRet
_ 0.4667**
(0.0000)
LMedTurn
_
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Table 4
Cross-Sectional OLS Estimation Results
This table provides the results of cross-sectional regressions where the information asymmetry measures are the
dependent variables and the proxies for uncertainty about future cash flows (alongside controls) are the independent
variables. We use as proxies for uncertainty about future cash flows two definitions of dispersion of analysts'
earnings forecasts: log of the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts (StdEst) and log of the coefficient of variation
of analysts' forecasts (CoefEst). I/B/E/S provides monthly observations of the standard deviation and mean of the
analysts' forecasts for the current end-of-fiscal-year. StdEst is the simple average of the monthly standard deviation
observations for all months in 1999, and CoefEst is the ratio of the average standard deviation to the absolute value
of the average monthly mean observations. We also use two proxies for uncertainty about future cash flows based
on past earnings: VLPred is an earning predictability measure provided by Value Line Investment Survey that is
derived from the standard deviation of percentage changes in quarterly earnings over an eight-year period, and
StdEPS is log of the standard deviation of annual earnings for the five years prior to 1999. The following set of
control variables is used in each regression: the logarithmic transformation of the average daily market capitalization
(LAvgCap), the standard deviation of daily returns (StdRet), and the logarithmic transformation of the median daily
turnover (LMedTurn). The regressions also include (but they are not shown in the table) a set of two-digit SIC
dummies to control for industry effects, and dummies for the three primary markets (NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq) to
control for institutional characteristics of the markets. Panel A presents the results for the MRR measure, the
permanent price impact of the order flow innovation, estimated using the methodology in Madhavan, Richardson,
and Roomans (1997). Panel B presents the results for the HASAB measure, the trade-correlated component of the
efficient price variance (in standard deviation per hour form), estimated using the methodology in Hasbrouck
(1991b). Panel C presents the results for HASR, the ratio of the trade-correlated component to the total efficient
price variance, also from Hasbrouck (1991b). All estimations are done using OLS, and we report p-values in
parenthesis calculated using White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. "**" indicates significance at the
1% level and "*" indicates significance at the 5% level.
Panel A: MRR (dependent variable)
Control variables
StdEst
(p-value)
CoefEst
(p-value)
VLPred
(p-value)
StdEPS
(p-value)
LAvgCap
(p-value)
StdRet
(p-value)
LMedTurn
(p-value)
AdjR2
(in %)
Obs.
-0.00340**
-0.0209** 0.6214** -0.0334** 61.14 2867
(0.0014) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
-0.00112 -0.0208** 0.6255** -0.0338** 61.02 2867
(0.1551) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
-0.00008* -0.0187** 0.4460** -0.0336** 65.43 2067
(0.0379) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
0.00022 -0.0206** 0.5654** -0.0333** 60.86 2836
(0.8191) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
-0.00184
-0.00010* -0.0188** 0.4605** -0.0335** 65.46 2067
(0.1416) (0.0118) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0000)
-0.00153 -0.00011** -0.0189** 0.4952** -0.0337** 65.47 2067
(0.1263) (0.0077) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0000)
-0.00386** 0.00147 -0.0211** 0.5969** -0.0330** 61.02 2836
(0.0009) (0.1660) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
-0.00123 0.00050 -0.0209** 0.6033** -0.0333** 60.88 2836
(0.1250) (0.6191) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
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Panel B: HASAB (dependent variable)
Control variables
StdEst
(p-value)
CoefEst
(p-value)
VLPred
(p-value)
StdEPS
(p-value)
LAvgCap
(p-value)
StdRet
(p-value)
LMedTurn
(p-value)
AdjR2
(in %)
Obs.
-0.00012
-0.0280** 6.0764** -0.0060 38.13 2859
(0.9735) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2491)
0.01325** -0.0254** 5.6598** -0.0066 38.67 2859
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2014)
-0.00031* -0.0228** 6.4685** -0.0014 42.39 2062
(0.0395) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8252)
0.00100 -0.0278** 6.0960** -0.0058 38.29 2828
(0.7764) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2845)
-0.00434
-0.00036* -0.0230** 6.5028** -0.0012 42.39 2062
(0.2928) (0.0286) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8502)
0.01313** -8.22e-05 -0.0216** 6.0456** -5.34e-5 42.83 2062
(0.0006) (0.5943) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9930)
-0.00117 0.00137 -0.0280** 6.1056** -0.0254 38.28 2828
(0.7684) (0.7207) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4709)
0.01322** -0.00192 -0.0251** 5.6894** -0.0059 38.80 2828
(0.0000) (0.5992) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2762)
Panel C: HASR (dependent variable)
Control variables
StdEst
(p-value)
CoefEst
(p-value)
VLPred
(p-value)
StdEPS
(p-value)
LAvgCap
(p-value)
StdRet
(p-value)
LMedTurn
(p-value)
AdjR2
(in %)
Obs.
-0.00106
-0.0127** -0.8555** -0.0067** 45.69 2859
(0.4882) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0046)
-0.00191 -0.0130** -0.8054** -0.0068** 45.72 2859
(0.0877) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0043)
0.00001 -0.0128** -0.9170** -0.0045 42.02 2062
(0.8512) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1198)
0.00102 -0.0126** -0.8660** -0.0069** 45.53 2828
(0.4936) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0042)
0.00188 0.00003 -0.0127** -0.9318** -0.0045 42.02 2062
(0.3211) (0.6422) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1137)
-0.00180 -0.00002 -0.0130** -0.8592** -0.0046 42.03 2062
(0.2405) (0.7962) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1070)
-0.00177 0.00160 -0.0128** -0.8516** -0.0068** 45.54 2828
(0.2842) (0.3227) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0048)
-0.00228* 0.00152 -0.0131** -0.7959** -0.0069** 45.58 2828
(0.0452) (0.3143) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0042)
44
Table 5
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Tests and Cross-Sectional 2SLS Estimation
This table provides the results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests as well as cross-sectional two-stage-least-squares
(2SLS) regressions where the information asymmetry measures are the dependent variables and the analysts proxies
for uncertainty about future cash flows (alongside controls) are the independent variables. The following
instruments are used for analysts' earnings forecasts dispersion: (i) the log standard deviation of EPS for the five
years prior to 1999 from COMPUSTAT, (ii) the one-year lagged growth of EPS, (iii) the average absolute value of
quarterly sales growth in 1999 from COMPUSTAT, (iv) the number of days with listing records in CRSP, (v) the
log of the number of SIC codes associated with the firm, and (vi) the dividend payout ratio for 1999 from
COMPUSTAT. We use as proxies for uncertainty about future cash flows two definitions of dispersion of analysts'
earnings forecasts: log of the standard deviation of analysts forecasts (StdEst) and log of the coefficient of variation
of analysts forecasts (CoefEst). I/B/E/S provides monthly observations of the standard deviation and mean of the
analysts' forecasts for the current end-of-fiscal-year. StdEst is the simple average of the monthly standard deviation
observations for all months in 1999, and CoefEst is the ratio of the average standard deviation to the absolute value
of the average monthly mean observations. The following set of control variables constructed over the sample
period is used in each regression: the logarithmic transformation of the average daily market capitalization
(LAvgCap), the standard deviation of daily returns (StdRet), and the logarithmic transformation of the median daily
turnover (LMedTurn). The regressions also include (but they are not shown in the table) a set of two-digit SIC
dummies to control for industry effects, and dummies for the three primary markets (NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq) to
control for institutional characteristics of the markets. The table presents the regression results for the MRR
measure, the permanent price impact of the order flow innovation, estimated using the methodology in Madhavan,
Richardson, and Roomans (1997), the HASAB measure, the trade-correlated component of the efficient price
variance (in standard deviation per hour form), estimated using the methodology in Hasbrouck (1991b), and HASR,
the ratio of the trade-correlated component to the total efficient price variance, also from Hasbrouck (1991b). "**"
indicates significance at the 1% level and "*" indicates significance at the 5% level.
Control variables
Dependent
variables
StdEst
(p-value)
CoefEst
(p-value)
LAvgCap
(p-value)
StdRet
(p-value)
LMedTurn
(p-value)
Durbin-Wu-
Hausman
statistic
(p-value)
Obs.
-0.0051
-0.0214** 0.6606** -0.0316** 0.3770 2454
(0.0861) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5392)
-0.0020 -0.0212** 0.6821** -0.0321** 0.0599 2454
MRR
(0.5901) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.8066)
0.0007 -0.0258** 6.1250** -0.0028 0.0076 2447
(0.9484) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.6321) (0.9304)
0.0117 -0.0236** 5.7541** -0.0030 0.0132 2447
HASAB
(0.3739) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5810) (0.9086)
0.0006 -0.0126** -0.7809** -0.0060* 0.1400 2447
(0.9031) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0139) (0.7084)
0.0022 -0.0123** -0.8460** -0.0060* 0.5510 2447
(0.6986) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0110) (0.4579)
HASR
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Table 6
FERC and FINC Analysis
This table provides estimates of correlations between the information asymmetry measures and two proxies for
price informativeness about future earnings, FERC and FINC. To construct these proxies, we run the following two
regressions:
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where rt is the quarterly return at time t, rt+τ is the return τ quarters ahead, ∆Et is the change in EPS at time t, and
∆Et+τ is the change in EPS t quarters ahead. All earnings changes are scaled by the price at time t-1. We construct
the returns for four quarters in 1999 using CRSP, and take EPS data from COMPUSTAT for 1999 and the first two
quarters of 2000 (we set τ=2). The definitions of the price informativeness proxies are:
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Since each firm has only four observations, we group stocks with similar information asymmetry measures and
estimate for each group a common price informativeness proxy. The information asymmetry measure for the group
is the average of the measures of the stocks in the group. For the MRR measure, we sort the sample firms according
to MRR, form 287 groups of 10 stocks each, estimate the two equations above for each group separately, and
calculate FERC and FINC for the group. A similar procedure is applied to the HASAB and HASR measures.
Panel A presents the Pearson correlations between the groups' information asymmetry measures (where a group
measure is the mean of the measures of the individual stocks in the group) and both FERC and FINC. Panels B, C,
and D present the correlations and p-values of the three information asymmetry measures with FERC and FINC
controlling for the amount of public information and liquidity trading by dividing the stocks into four categories. For
the MRR measure, we sort the stocks according to AvgCap, and separate into two categories (Low and High) with
equal number of stocks. Each category is sorted according to MedTurn and divided into two equal categories. We
then sort the stocks within each category according to MRR, and form groups of 10 stocks each. We estimate FERC
and FINC for each group and compute the correlations separately for each category. The process is repeated with
control variables StdRet and MedTurn. A similar procedure is applied to the HASAB and HASR measures. In all
panels, the two-sided p-values for the asymptotic test of zero correlations are shown in parentheses. "**" indicates
significance at the 1% level and "*" indicates significance at the 5% level.
Panel A: Unconditional correlations
FERC
(p-value)
FINC
(p-value)
Obs.
MRR -0.1003* -0.0369 287
(0.0441) (0.4644)
HASAB -0.1419* -0.1647** 287
(0.0126) (0.0033)
HASR -0.0608 -0.0679 287
(0.3967) (0.2009)
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Panel B: MRR Conditional Correlations
Control
Categories
FERC
(p-value)
FINC
(p-value)
Obs. Control
Categories
FERC
(p-value)
FINC
(p-value)
Obs.
Low AvgCap -0.0502
-0.2411 72 Low StdRet -0.0725 0.0492 72
Low MedTurn (0.5880) (0.0536) Low MedTurn (0.4598) (0.6291)
Low AvgCap -0.1419 0.1349 72 Low StdRet -0.0505 0.1040 72
High MedTurn (0.0849) (0.2030) High MedTurn (0.6861) (0.3294)
High AvgCap -0.1083 0.0995 72 High StdRet -0.0288 0.0065 72
Low MedTurn (0.4240) (0.3496) Low MedTurn (0.7059) (0.9258)
High AvgCap -0.1819
-0.1978* 72 High StdRet -0.0070 0.0123 72
High MedTurn (0.0722) (0.0270) High MedTurn (0.9189) (0.8797)
Panel C: HASAB Conditional correlations
Control
Categories
FERC
(p-value)
FINC
(p-value)
Obs. Control
Categories
FERC
(p-value)
FINC
(p-value)
Obs.
Low AvgCap -0.1658
-0.0560 71 Low StdRet 0.0154 -0.0004 71
Low MedTurn (0.1153) (0.8066) Low MedTurn (0.8830) (0.9964)
Low AvgCap -0.1840*
-0.2599** 72 Low StdRet -0.2159 -0.1206 72
High MedTurn (0.0299) (0.0096) High MedTurn (0.1875) (0.3291)
High AvgCap -0.1933
-0.0819 72 High StdRet -0.1529 -0.0085 72
Low MedTurn (0.1688) (0.5028) Low MedTurn (0.0648) (0.9471)
High AvgCap 0.1789 0.0565 72 High StdRet -0.0381 -0.1047 72
High MedTurn (0.1246) (0.5075) High MedTurn (0.7735) (0.3227)
Panel D: HASR Conditional correlations
Control
Categories
FERC
(p-value)
FINC
(p-value)
Obs. Control
Categories
FERC
(p-value)
FINC
(p-value)
Obs.
Low AvgCap 0.0766
-0.1423 71 Low StdRet -0.1046 -0.0011 71
Low MedTurn (0.6243) (0.1209) Low MedTurn (0.4612) (0.9921)
Low AvgCap -0.0827
-0.0178 72 Low StdRet -0.1657 -0.1123 72
High MedTurn (0.5330) (0.8732) High MedTurn (0.3883) (0.3533)
High AvgCap -0.1580 0.0902 72 High StdRet 0.0492 -0.1736 72
Low MedTurn (0.4148) (0.2783) Low MedTurn (0.6667) (0.0817)
High AvgCap 0.1538
-0.0858 72 High StdRet -0.0660 0.0143 72
High MedTurn (0.1564) (0.4109) High MedTurn (0.5183) (0.8929)
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Table 7
Summary Statistics for the Event-study Sample
The basic universe for the event-study sample consists of all stocks that were added to or deleted from the Russell 1000 index in 1999. We restrict the sample to
common stocks with trading data between April and mid-July, and eliminate firms about which we find news reports discussing mergers in the months around
the Russell reconstitution dates. The following variables are calculated for each stock using data in CRSP: CapMay28 is the market capitalization on May 28 (the
number of shares outstanding multiplied by the closing price), PrcMay28 and PrcJuly1 are the closing prices on these two dates, BegTurn is the average daily
turnover (the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding) for the pre-event interval (May 24–28), and EndTurn is the average daily
turnover for the post-event interval (July 1–8). The following variables are calculated for each stock using data in TAQ: BegTrd and EndTrd are the average
daily number of trades in the pre- and post-events intervals, Beg$Sprd and End$Sprd are the average dollar spreads in the pre- and post-event intervals, and
Beg%Sprd and End%Sprd are the average percentage spreads (dollars spreads divided by the mid-quotes) in the pre- and post-event intervals. Panel A presents
the statistics for the 130 stocks in the addition sample, and Panel B presents the statistics for the 87 stocks in the deletion sample.
Panel A: Addition Sample
CapMay28
(in million $)
PrcMay28
(in $)
PrcJuly1
(in $)
BegTurn
(in %)
EndTurn
(in %)
BegTrd EndTrd Beg$Sprd
(in $)
End$Sprd
(in $)
Beg%Sprd
(in %)
End%Sprd
(in %)
Mean 2,485.28 50.46 51.45 1.76 1.82 1,631.86 1,622.83 0.29 0.24 0.65 0.54
Median 1,786.01 46.50 46.56 0.79 0.81 404.20 422.60 0.24 0.20 0.58 0.49
Std. Dev. 2,499.59 27.15 28.80 2.33 3.11 3,753.72 3,231.21 0.17 0.12 0.33 0.26
Min. 197.75 8.50 8.13 0.03 0.07 18.40 25.20 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.12
Max. 21,402.83 177.19 159.69 15.38 25.58 26,396.80 18,667.60 1.19 0.69 2.64 1.72
Obs. 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130
Panel B: Deletion Sample
CapMay28
(in million $)
PrcMay28
(in $)
PrcJuly1
(in $)
BegTurn
(in %)
EndTurn
(in %)
BegTrd EndTrd Beg$Sprd
(in $)
End$Sprd
(in $)
Beg%Sprd
(in %)
End%Sprd
(in %)
Mean 972.23 21.25 22.27 0.60 0.64 253.11 274.76 0.24 0.18 1.08 0.95
Median 1,066.62 18.88 19.19 0.46 0.49 144.00 156.80 0.17 0.15 0.84 0.80
Std. Dev. 305.24 19.55 20.25 0.57 0.55 314.93 366.13 0.63 0.28 0.58 0.53
Min. 192.69 3.25 1.88 0.02 0.07 7.20 14.00 0.06 0.06 0.47 0.24
Max. 1,346.02 181.00 185.00 3.91 2.94 1,796.40 2,693.80 6.04 2.72 3.59 4.04
Obs. 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87
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Table 8
Event Study Analysis
This table presents the analysis of changes in the information asymmetry measures around the Russell 1000
reconstitution in 1999. The pre-event interval is May 24–28 and the post-event interval is July 1–8 (each contains 5
trading days). ∆MRR$ is the change in the MRR$ measure (similar to MRR but estimated with price differences
rather than log price differences) between the post- and pre-event intervals. Similarly, ∆MRR is the change in the
MRR measure, ∆HASAB is the change in the HASAB measure, and ∆HASR is the change in the HASR measure.
The second column reports the mean of the change in measures and the p-value (in parentheses) of a t-test against
the hypothesis of zero change. The third column reports the median of the change in measures and the p-value (in
parentheses) of a Wlicoxon signed rank test against the hypothesis of zero change. Regressions 1 and 2 (columns
four through seven) both have the following form:
i i iVφ α β ε∆ = + ∆ +
where ∆φi is the change in the information asymmetry measures and ∆Vi is the change in a proxy for normal
volume. In Regression 1, the proxy for normal volume is the average daily turnover over the interval (i.e.,
∆Vi=EndTurn-BegTurn). In Regression 2, the proxy for normal volume is the average daily number of trades over
the interval (i.e., ∆Vi=EndTrd-BegTrd). The estimation of the regressions is done using OLS, and p-values (in
parentheses) are calculated using White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Panel A presents the results
for the 130 stocks in the addition sample, and Panel B presents the results for the 87 stocks in the deletion sample.
"**" indicates significance at the 1% level and "*" indicates significance at the 5% level (both against a two-sided
alternative).
Panel A: Addition Sample
Regression 1 Regression 2
Dependent
Variable
Mean
(p-value of
t-test)
Median
(p-value of
Wilcoxon test)
α
(p-value)
β(Turn)
(p-value)
α
(p-value)
β(Trd)
(p-value)
∆MRR$ -0.005421** -0.001407** -0.005403** -0.000317 -0.005424** 0.000000
(0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.1910) (0.0008) (0.2563)
∆MRR -0.000118** -0.000040** -0.000117** -0.000007 -0.000118** 0.000000
(0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.1409) (0.0007) (0.2871)
∆HASAB -0.126197** -0.091680** -0.126586** 0.006924 -0.126204** -0.000001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3412) (0.0000) (0.9194)
∆HASR -0.000449 0.006005 -0.000344 -0.001858* -0.000479 -0.000003**
(0.9436) (0.6141) (0.9568) (0.0348) (0.9398) (0.0008)
Panel B: Deletion Sample
Regression 1 Regression 2
Dependent
Variable
Mean
(p-value of
t-test)
Median
(p-value of
Wilcoxon test)
α
(p-value)
β(Turn)
(p-value)
α
(p-value)
β(Trd)
(p-value)
∆MRR$ -0.002081 -0.001672** -0.001990 -0.001921 -0.002069 -0.000001
(0.3322) (0.0008) (0.3556) (0.1741) (0.3384) (0.6608)
∆MRR -0.000222** -0.000089** -0.000218** -0.000081 -0.000221** -0.000000
(0.0027) (0.0001) (0.0033) (0.0740) (0.0030) (0.3088)
∆HASAB -0.047807* -0.035549* -0.050112* 0.049070 -0.050869* 0.000141
(0.0276) (0.0227) (0.0150) (0.4430) (0.0169) (0.0577)
∆HASR -0.022325 -0.020980 -0.021578 -0.015907 -0.021994 -0.000015
(0.0708) (0.1670) (0.0765) (0.4362) (0.0758) (0.2030)
